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In The History of Sexuality, An Introduction,1 Foucault makes a series of powerful 
claims about the relationship between confession, truth and sexuality, which, at least 
to the extent that they bear on confession, are perhaps more counter intuitive now, 
some thirty years later, than they were even in 1976 when they were first published. 
Confession does not reveal the truth, it produces it; confession doesn’t liberate and 
free the subject, it condemns her to an endless cycle of guilt, shame and yet more 
confession; the practice of ritualized confession did not arise as the expression of a 
deep-seated human need to speak inner truths; on the contrary, the inner self to 
whom that truth-speaking is attributed was itself a long time in the making, and the 
eventual confessions of that self were the consequence of highly coercive practices, 
which co-incidentally and rather conveniently, eventually produced the desire for 
confession.  In other words, the desire to confess followed the act of confession, 
which was literally forced upon the reluctant, skeptical and initially very resistant 
European populace of the early Middle Ages, first by the Roman Church and later 
by the Protestant Churches.  Confession, Foucault very clearly demonstrated, is 
more closely associated with the profanity of violence than it is with the sanctity of 
heaven.  
 
So how then, a mere few hundred years later and at a time when traditional 
Christian religious observance is rapidly declining in the West, has confession 
managed to burst so far out of the containment of the confessional box that in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries it has virtually become the sine qua non 
of western subjectivity?  How have confessional discourses become so deeply em-
bedded in our desiring bodies and our institutions that we can no longer see or feel 
the disciplinary bite of regulatory power?  The multiple forms of confession are om-
nipresent now, underpinning the spirit of much of personal, social and cultural life, 
                                                 
1
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1, translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1990). 
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from the all too popular Oprah and Dr. Phil to reality and make-over television; from 
self-help and therapy culture, to our literary love affair with autobiographies; 
Confessional practices underpin our education system, our approach to health and 
healing; they define and structure our most intimate relationships, and confession is 
all but the Rosetta Stone of contemporary moral  life.  To fail to know and be able to 
confess/speak your ”inner truth,” in Western culture today is not to experience an 
existential crisis but an ontological one.  Bracket the question of who is doing the 
listening, we are the subjects who now speak ourselves incessantly into being, who 
endlessly develop new tools for speaking even more—think Facebook, My Space, 
the blogosphere—and to the extent that the speaking that matters most is the hard 
won truth of our inner selves wrenched against our owns wills from inner darkness 
into shameful light, we are indeed the very exquisite embodiment of Foucault’s 
assertion that Western ”man” has become a confessing animal.  So into this mael-
strom of proliferating confessional discourses, Chloë Taylor’s very thoughtful, 
impeccably argued  The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault: A Genealogy 
of the ‘Confessing Animal’ arrives like a very welcome Occam’s Razor.  
  
Drawing on Foucault’s observation about the contingent nature of confession in The 
History of Sexuality, Taylor’s book is deeply structured by the notion that the 
confessional subjects of today have very little in common with those of the past and 
her first three chapters are a clear exposition of this point.  When biographers like 
Peter Brown impute to the fourth century church father, Saint Augustine, a project of 
“finding himself” or engaging in “an act of therapy,” they are, as Taylor notes, 
attributing to him “reasons for which modern subjects commonly confess,” (2) and 
they are “assuming continuity in confessional practices over a vast period of time.” 
(2)  This is an assumption that extends to include an unsupportable story of con-
tinuity in the subject itself.  Thus, Taylor’s project is to take the fragments of 
Foucault’s observations about confession, particularly those of his later writings, and 
substantially supplement them in order to trouble an otherwise totalizing history of 
confession and the confessional subject that would see a linear narrative running 
from Augustine to the Christian Middle Ages, through Rousseau and the 
Enlightenment, to the nineteenth-century rise of psychiatry, and on to the twentieth 
century institutionalization of psychology, particularly through Freudian psycho-
analysis, which has resulted in so many of us now speaking in Freudian tongues.  
This is indeed much of the terrain of Taylor’s book, but, it bears repeating, this is 
genealogy, not linear history. While Foucault’s work is both the departure point and 
touchstone of Taylor’s book, and genealogy is the method, her analyses are deeply 
enriched, extended and complicated by her engagement with the work of other 
continental philosophers who have similarly tackled confession and its analogues, 
namely Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, Paul de Man, Ladelle McWhorter, Emmanuel 
Levinas, Julia Kristeva and Franz Fanon, to name but a few. 
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The book is coherently organized with the first three chapters focused on providing 
an account of the development of the confessing subject from antiquity to 
modernity.  The fourth chapter departs considerably from the first three in offering a 
fascinating and important consideration of the disciplining of the one who listens, 
for confession is always relational; and the fifth and final chapter is a consideration 
of alternative technologies of the self to confession.  Given how deeply embedded 
Taylor has by this stage shown disciplinary confessional practices to be, this final 
chapter poses the question of the extent to which there is any room for practices of 
the self which tip the balance away from discipline and more towards care of the 
self.  Taking as her model Foucault’s exemplary accounts of the non-confessional 
ancient practice of self-writing, hupomnêmata, Taylor strikes out on her own in this 
chapter more than anywhere else and she does so in ways that we can only hope 
might gesture in the direction of her future work.  Her analysis, for example, of the 
art of Artemesia Gentileschi as an example of non-confessional self-transformation 
oriented towards self-care rather than discipline is remarkably convincing.  This is a 
book thoroughly researched and referenced, rigorously argued and densely rich in 
detail, so at best in the remainder of this review I will only be able to draw attention 
to a few of the highlights. 
 
While there is much material of value in the first chapter, including a lovely account 
of the differences which underlie the confessional subject of antiquity—a subject 
clearly not confessing to the truth of himself for the inner self has yet to be 
produced—and an informative exposition of penance as the antecedent to 
confession, it is Taylor’s work with Augustine which stands out, not only because it 
takes up the greater part of the first chapter, but perhaps because she is tackling here 
a subject Foucault did not.  Needless to say, Augustine looms large in any conver-
sation about confession, identified as he so consistently is with the discursive origins 
of confession’s literary soul mate, autobiography.  So his unexplained absence in 
Foucault’s work reads first as lacuna, then as intentional, and finally as intriguing.  
Thus, and perhaps paradoxically, Taylor gives voice to Foucault’s silence by offering 
a careful exposition of the many ways in which Augustine was not an obvious 
exemplar of Foucauldian confession in an account that does double duty by also 
meaningfully contributing to the vast body of scholarship on Augustine, especially 
around the question of the development of interiority.  Taylor concludes that 
“Augustine’s work is neither an example of discipline nor of self care.” (46)  To the 
extent that Foucault’s definition of confession is a self-examination directed towards 
telling the truth of oneself to another, careful examination makes it clear that 
Augustine’s Confessions do not convincingly fit this definition.  Contrary to the 
tenacious readings of Augustine that would have him confessing the truth of 
himself, and for all that the Confessions do contain some biographical material, as 
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Taylor acutely observes, they actually leave aside considerably more than they 
cover.  Moreover, there is proportionally more theological argument, biblical exposi-
tion, accounts of other people’s lives, prayers and refutations, than there is bio-
graphical material, thus making the claim for autobiography tenuous at best.  In the 
end, Taylor argues, Augustine’s Confessions are a confession to his faith in God, and 
the plurality of material within them is best explained by this interpretation. 
Moreover, and as importantly, while the apparently agitated soul searching that 
characterizes the tone of different moments might reverberate for modern readers 
and critics with what they take to be recognizable anxieties, the Augustinian 
interiority from which those anxieties emanate differs markedly from modern 
interiorities, as does the intention of expressing them.  It’s worth citing Taylor at 
length here because in her characteristically understated way, she beautifully 
gestures towards the differences between modern confessional subjects confessing 
the truth of themselves and Augustine confessing his desire for the Other, for God” 
 
Augustine is writing in the hopes that God will respond, crying out in the hopes 
of an answer, speaking because he wishes to listen to one who has too long 
remained silent. This straining of his ears, the ears even of his heart, is the 
painful longing which pulsates through the entire Confessions, and not the 
longing for self-revelation. Augustine is compelled to write his Confessions, and 
is anxious and beset, not like Rousseau, not by the need to speak about himself, 
but by the longing to hear the Other speak at last. (40) 
 
In emphasizing Augustine’s concerns with the Other rather than the self, Taylor very 
clearly signals discontinuity rather than continuity in the confessing subject.   
 
Chapter two fairly closely charts Foucault’s trajectory in offering an account of the 
emergence of confessional subjectivity from the Counter-Reformation through the 
Enlightenment to the late nineteenth century.  This is a trajectory that sees confession 
invested in the production of particular kinds of truths and inexorably caught up in 
what Foucault describes as “perpetual spirals of pleasure and power.” (104)  As we 
might expect, this chapter includes a substantive consideration of Rousseau and it is 
a discussion rendered both more complex and more interesting by Taylor’s 
engagement with the readings of Jacques Derrida and Paul De Man, particularly 
concerning Rousseau’s account of the incident of the stolen ribbon.  At stake is the 
status of the truth of confessions, the seductive power of confessions, and the 
question of confession’s guilty shameful pleasures.  This chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the writings of contemporary autobiographers, Annie Ernaux and Nelly 
Arcan, through which Taylor offers a very insightful challenge to Foucault’s 
assertion that confession is always caught up in spirals of pleasure.  On the contrary, 
she says, the seductive failures of Ernaux and Arcan’s confessions “show the manner 
in which we may believe what Foucault writes about seductiveness and the erotic 
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pleasures of confession at our peril.” (115) 
 
As noted earlier, chapter three concludes the chapters dealing with the production of 
the confessional subject and offers an extended consideration of whether psycho-
analysis is inherently normative and disciplinary or whether it can also be an 
expression of self-care.  Here Taylor considers the work of Julia Kristeva, who 
affirms the notion of psychoanalysis as an aesthetic practice of self care and John 
Toews, who argues that a contemporary neo-Freudian psychoanalysis can be 
understood in terms of Foucault’s later work on self-governance.  
 
For different reasons, chapters four and five stand out in the way they strike new 
ground.  Taylor’s analysis in chapter four of the ethics of the relation between 
confessor and confessant that focuses more on the experience of the one who listens 
is compelling.  Noting that the confessional subject desires as much to hear the 
confessions of others as she does to offer her own, Taylor draws our attention not to 
the benevolence of this desire but to its subtle violence.  The confessional subject, she 
suggests, desires the confessions of others “as occasions to reflect on herself or in 
order to spark further confessional self-reflection,” (173) thus making this a very 
narcissistic act of self assertion rather than regard of the other.  With the coercive 
expectation of reciprocity that underpins so much of the dynamic of contemporary 
confessional practices, and in the endless assertion of self, we are a very long way 
here from Augustine’s confession of his desire to hear the voice of the Other.   
 
Taylor’s final chapter on alternatives to confession stands out for me in two ways. 
Firstly her engagement with silence as a technology of self-care is intriguing if 
tantalizingly brief.  She notes Foucault’s own silence with respect to certain kinds of 
self-disclosure and she is appropriately cautious about silence as a strategy of 
resistance to normative discipline given the way it has so often been a tool of the 
powerful.   Notwithstanding this concern, alongside the significant role of speech in 
confessional discourses, perhaps silence warrants a more substantive engagement. 
Secondly, while there are numerous references throughout to the work of feminist 
philosophers, this final chapter is clearly more broadly engaged with feminism, 
albeit an ambivalent engagement.  For example, Taylor rightly criticizes the way 
many feminist art critics have appropriated the life of Artemisia Gentileschi in order 
to read her art in ways that untenably push it to tell contemporary stories of 
women’s desires and oppression.  By contrast Taylor offers her own analysis of 
Gentileschi’s work as an example of non-confessional Foucauldian self-care.  Bertha 
Pappenheim’s politically inspired social work after her ”failed” analysis with Joseph 
Breuer is another convincing example of non-confessional self-care.  And Taylor 
notes that for many Foucauldian feminists, feminism itself functions as a technology 
of the self more oriented towards care than discipline.  In the end, however, one is 
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left with the sense that Taylor’s own sensibilities more closely follow those of 
Ladelle McWhorter, who observed that while feminist practice was initially a joyful 
act of self-fashioning, and thus had affiliations with freedom, its attachment to the 
normative category of woman ultimately meant that McWhorter would abandon 
feminism in favour of her ongoing philosophical practice, which she identified as 
less normative, less disciplinary.  In many ways this is an appropriate place for 
Taylor to end her book.  By implicitly offering philosophy itself as a practice of self-
care we return at the end to where we began, to the ancients. Surely, Foucault would 
approve.  
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